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A major obstacle in analyzing the evolution of information exchange and processing is our insuf-
ficient understanding of the underlying signaling and decision-making biological mechanisms. For
instance, it is unclear why are humans unique in developing such extensive communication abilities.
To treat this problem, a method based on the mutual information approach is developed that evalu-
ates the information content of communication between interacting individuals through correlations
of their behavior patterns (rather than calculating the information load of exchanged discrete sig-
nals, e.g. Shannon entropy). It predicts that correlated interactions of the indirect reciprocity type
together with affective behavior and selection rules changing with time are necessary conditions for
the emergence of significant information exchange. Population size variations accelerate this devel-
opment. These results are supported by evidence of demographic bottlenecks, distinguishing human
from other species’ (e.g. apes) evolution line. They indicate as well new pathways for evolution of
information based phenomena, such as intelligence and complexity.
PACS numbers:
Information is a resource, like energy or food, con-
tributing to the evolutionary success of a population and
its members. As a consequence, the majority of biological
species, from bacteria and plants to human beings, have
developed skills to sense their environment, communicate
with each other [1, 2, 3, 4] and in some cases even inter-
fere with the signalling of hostile organisms [5]. The abili-
ties to acquire and process information, however, change
significantly across populations. Humans, for instance,
demonstrate unique techniques of information transmis-
sion [6]. The variety of communication skills and relative
brain sizes [7] indicates important constraints on the de-
velopment of human-like information exchange and pro-
cessing, which provide superior abilities for joining efforts
to control and modify the environment.
Two main factors constrain the evolution of informa-
tion exchange and intelligent processing. First, informa-
tion comes at a cost that can be higher than the cor-
responding evolutionary gain. Many organisms there-
fore, avoid sustaining excessive sensing and decision mak-
ing abilities by preferring, for example, stochastic (non-
responsive) behavior in a fluctuating environment [8, 9].
Second, individual fitness can be improved in the course
of a competition by selfish hiding of useful information,
making cooperative fair signaling evolutionary disadvan-
tageous. Mimicry, deception [10] and other methods of
selfish information protection are common in the living
world, from populations of bacteria [11] to states of gov-
ernment. It is however still unclear what allowed humans
to overcome them with such an efficiency.
We address here the question: What are the necessary
evolutionary selection conditions for the development
of communication (significant information exchange and
processing) between members of a population? Previ-
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ous attempts to answer similar questions, can be roughly
separated into two main categories: First, analysis of the
emergence of various communicative behavior strategies,
e.g. cooperation [12, 13, 14], fair signaling [15] or ac-
quisition of a common language [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Second, applying information theory to investigate how
signals become associated with meaning [22]. In this
work the second approach is followed. The amount of
exchanged information is evaluated by the strength of
correlations between different signals. This is different
from the conventional approach that quantifies only the
information content of discrete signals.
Consider interacting organisms generating and display-
ing some signals, such as information carrying messages
or behavior and display patterns. How can one be sure
that they communicate, in the sense that some informa-
tion is transmitted, comprehended and utilized for choos-
ing a specific behavior, e.g. cooperation or selfishness?
For instance, no communication is required for interac-
tions where the competitors choose their behavior inde-
pendently of each other. On the other hand, significant
information exchange occurs in the course of correlated
reactions between two interacting organisms, that are
committed to a common role agreement [23], e.g. who
is the donor and who is the recipient. Consequently, cor-
relations between observable behavior patterns can serve
as a quantitative measure of information exchange, al-
lowing to construct an ab initio model of communication
with no a priori assumptions concerning specific mecha-
nisms of information transfer and processing.
In this paper, we demonstrate that a unique set of evo-
lutionary conditions provides a solution both for a sta-
ble, maximal information exchange between individuals
and for the naturally occurring diversity of communica-
tion abilities across populations. Communication skills
in populations are evaluated by presence of correlated,
rather than independent, behavior patterns. Correlated
behavior is predicted to co-evolve with an ability to af-
2fect the competitor’s behavior, creating populations with
a mixture of evolutionary important correlated interac-
tions of the indirect reciprocity type [24], and more fre-
quent non-responsive behavior, lacking any evolutionary
gain. Another result is that fluctuations in population
size, which are extreme in human evolution compared to
other great apes species [25], are an indicator of faster
evolution of information exchange and processing. The
supporting analytical tools are presented in the supple-
mentary material (SM) section.
Any evolvable individual property (a phenotype)
emerges as a mutation in a population, subsequently de-
veloping or waning with generations as a consequence of
natural selection. The selection process can be approxi-
mated by a game [26, 27, 28] where players A and B react
mutually. Wpq will be associated with the payoff that a
player receives for his reaction p vs. q of the competitor.
In a given interaction, each competitor may obtain pay-
offs according to different weight tables. This allows one
to take into account that an individual may be found in
different modes (states such as e.g. age, intra-population
rank, sex, ability to acquire information, etc.) that influ-
ence his payoff (see Fig. 1A). Some of the payoff tables
have been named by analogy to real-life situations (e.g.
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Battle of the Sexes etc.).
It must be stressed though that in these cases both com-
petitors play under identical weight tables (see Fig. 1B).
Consider repeated interactions between two individu-
als A and B. Let us assume that each interaction in-
cludes exchange of some information carrying messages
of any type, together with either selfish S or cooperation
C reactions. The terms ”reaction” or ”response”, rather
than strategy, are used to emphasize that individuals do
not act independently, but may react to their opponent’s
actions. The term ”strategy” refers here to the deci-
sion process that leads to a specific act. For instance, in
this context one may say that a player has used the Tit-
for-Tat strategy to choose either cooperative or selfish
reaction, while playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
This paper demonstrates that only the statistics of mu-
tual reactions is required to estimate the amount of infor-
mation that A and B exchange, comprehend and utilize
during their strategic decision making. An alternative
approach could be based on analysis of information load
of messages generated by the competitors. There ex-
ist numerous measures for information in language-like
signals, including Shannon entropy [29] and Kolmogorov
complexity [30]. Association of information in a signal
with communication, implicitly assumes that competi-
tors fully understand each message. This assumption,
however, is not applicable to evolvable systems, since de-
veloping signals are always ambiguous.
All information exchanged by competitors A and B,
pertinent to their mutual behavior, will be associated to
the amount of information that one can infer concerning
the unknown behavior of A from observing the behav-
ior of B (or vice versa). For instance, an external ob-
server, by observing during an interaction the reaction of
B, e.g. cooperation, will be able to predict with reduced
uncertainty (equals to information gain) the reaction of
A. Competitors lacking any mutual knowledge, have to
exchange information during their interaction, in order
to achieve dependent, rather than random, mutual be-
havior.
Fortunately, information theory provides a standard
expression for mutual information [31], describing reduc-
tion in uncertainty of one signal through the knowledge
of another. So far it was applied to analysis of corre-
lations, complexity and communication in physical [32],
linguistic [33] and biological systems [34, 35, 36, 37]. In
our case, mutual information I indicates how much infor-
mation (in bits) can be derived from the reaction of one
of the competitors, while knowing certainly the reaction
of the other:
I =
∑
p,q=S,C
[
Ωpq log2
(
Ωpq
(ΩpS +ΩpC)(ΩSq +ΩCq)
)]
, (1)
where Ωpq is the probability of reactions p against q. This
work derives the selection rules that maximize the value
of mutual information I in an evolving system, adopting
it as a measure of communication.
The properties of the mutual information expression
(1) justify its relevance to the problem of communica-
tion. Mutual information I varies from 0 to 1 bit, reach-
ing its maximum in case of positively (S vs. S and C
vs. C, ΩSS = ΩCC = 0.5 and ΩSC = ΩCS = 0) or
negatively (S vs. C and C vs. S, ΩSC = ΩCS = 0.5
and ΩSS = ΩCC = 0) correlated reactions, indicat-
ing that they require significant information exchange.
The minimum values of I = 0 correspond to indepen-
dent mutual reactions (as in case of mixed strategies)
(S is generated with probability xS , ΩSS = x
2
S ,ΩSC =
xS(1 − xS),ΩCS = (1 − xS)xS ,ΩCC = (1 − xS)2), in-
cluding unconditional selfishness xS = 1 (S vs. S,
ΩSS = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩCC = 0) and unconditional
cooperation xS = 0 (C vs. C, ΩCC = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS =
ΩSS = 0). Independent reactions, indeed, do not re-
quire any information exchange. Analysis of the evolu-
tionary stability of populations with correlated reactions
is therefore of major importance to describe the evolution
of abilities to exchange and process information.
In this model, an individual A possesses several behav-
ior modes (states) k ∈ {1, N}, each one characterized by
three evolvable parameters (ǫAk , α
A
k , β
A
k ) and weight table
W kpq. In the course of a competition, A acts in a spe-
cific mode k with probability ǫAk , generates either selfish
S or cooperative C reactions with a strategy defined by
(αAk , β
A
k ) and receives payoffs according toW
k
pq (Fig. 2A).
The conditional probabilities (αAk , β
A
k ) define the statis-
tics of reactions in each behavior mode: αk and 1 − αk
are, respectively, the probabilities to choose cooperation
C and selfish S reactions against the competitor’s uncon-
ditional selfish reaction S, while βk and 1 − βk are the
probabilities to choose cooperation C and selfish S reac-
tions against the competitor’s unconditional cooperation
3reaction C (see Fig. 2B). In this context, (αAk , β
A
k ) can
be viewed as selfishness aversion and cooperation attrac-
tion correspondingly. Affective behavior is introduced
by allowing the phenotypes of competing individuals to
depend on each other.
The ”mode” index makes possible a multi-game/multi-
strategy generalization, taking into account that individ-
uals may possess several behavior states (e.g. age, intra-
population rank, sex, ability to acquire information, etc.)
that affect both the payoffs W kpq and behavior (α
A
k , β
A
k )
of an individual A during an interaction. Each mode,
therefore, corresponds to a specific strategy and payoff
table (see Fig 2A). For instance, when A in mode(A) re-
acts with S vs. reaction C of B in mode(B),he receives
a payoff W
mode(A)
SC while B’s payoff will be W
mode(B)
CS as
shown in Fig 1A. All individuals are assumed to share
the same set of behavior modes k ∈ 1, N .
This phenotype description follows with some alterna-
tions previous attempts to incorporate conditional cor-
relations into game theory and biological applications
[8, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. Conditional probabili-
ties α and β are closely related to the reactive strategies
approach [41, 42]. Reactive strategies denote the proba-
bilities to cooperate after the competitor has cooperated
or defected during the previous interaction, while con-
ditional probabilities assign probabilities for cooperation
during the same interaction. This approach makes possi-
ble a general description of highly communicative game
strategies for choosing a specific reaction (like Tit-for-
Tat), together with non-communicative ones (e.g. mixed
strategies). Any game strategy in a course of a com-
petition leads to a specific statistics of mutual reactions
Ωpq. Conditional probabilities allow describing all possi-
ble statistics of reaction, effectively taking into account
any game strategy. The individual payoff, defining the
evolutionary success, can be expressed though α and β,
since it depends solely on the statistics Ωpq.
The payoff F (A,B) of an individual A interacting with
individual B is:
F (A,B) =
∑
i,j
ǫAi ǫ
B
j
[
Ωi,jSSW
i
SS +Ω
i,j
SCW
i
SC + . . .
+Ωi,jCSW
i
CS +Ω
i,j
CCW
i
CC
]
, (2)
where the summation includes all possible interactions
(mode i of A vs. mode j of B), taking into account the
corresponding probabilities of such interaction ǫAi ǫ
B
j and
the statistics of the mutual reactions Ωi,jpq . To calculate
the payoff F (A,B) and the information exchange rate I,
one should derive the statistics of the mutual reactions
Ωi,jpq as a function of the competing individuals’ pheno-
types.
The statistics of the mutual reactions Ωi,jpq during an
interaction of individuals A in mode i vs. B in mode j, is
a function of the phenotypes (αi, βi), (αj , βj) and their
reaction order in the course of a competition (the first to
respond lacks confident information on the competitor’s
intentions). The value of Ωi,jpq follows from definitions of
α and β, e.g.: Ωi,jCS , the probability of cooperation vs.
selfishness in a competition is equal to the conditional
probability αi ofA to cooperate with a selfish competitor,
multiplied by the unconditional probability γji of B to
provide reaction S during a competition with A (see Fig.
2B):
ΩSS = (1 − αi)γji, ΩCC = βi(1− γji)
ΩCS = αiγji, ΩSC = (1− βi)(1 − γji), (3)
where γji is:
γji(αj , βj, αi, βi) =
=
(1− βj)− (1− βi)(αj − βj)
1− (αi − βi)(αj − βj) .(4)
Derivation of eq. (4) follows from symmetry consider-
ations, for instance the statistics Ωi,jpq and Ω
j,i
pq have to
be identical. Fortunately, Ωi,jpq is independent of the or-
der of reactions in interactions which contribute to the
development of communication (see SM A3b, A 4 and
A5).
Two individuals possessing the same behavior mode
(αi, βi) = (αj , βj) = (α, β) exchange during an interac-
tion an amount of information:
I(α, β) = log2
(
(1− α)(1−α)γ(1− β)(1−β)(1−γ)ααγββ(1−γ)
γγ(1 − γ)γ
)
,
(5)
where, according to eq. (4), γ = γji(i = j) is:
γ =
1− β
1 + α− β . (6)
Eq. (5) follows from (1), taking into account eqs. (3) and
(4) (see SM A3 c). Expression (5) provides a quantita-
tive measure of the individual’s information processing
capability in each behavior mode (α, β).
According to eq. (5), the behavior modes (α = 1, β =
0) and (α = 0, β = 1) possess the maximal informa-
tion exchange rate (1 bit per interaction), as shown in
Fig. 2C. These modes can be classified according the
statistics of reactions Ωpq they generate. The mode
(α = 0, β = 1) corresponds to positively correlated re-
actions (ΩSS = 0.5,ΩCC = 0.5,ΩSC = ΩCS = 0),
similar to synchronous interactions of cells in a multi-
cellular organism, e.g. heart contraction. The mode
(α = 1, β = 0) corresponds to negatively correlated
statistics (ΩSC = 0.5,ΩCS = 0.5,ΩSS = ΩCC = 0), such
as interactions of the indirect reciprocity, taking C as
donor and S as recipient). The flux of information is zero
for the modes (α = β), (α = 0, β) and (α, β = 1), corre-
sponding to random mutual reactions, unconditional self-
ishness (ΩSS = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩCC = 0) and uncondi-
tional cooperation (ΩCC = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩSS = 0).
The evolution of positively correlated reactions (α =
0, β = 1) requires much longer times than the evolution
of negatively correlated ones (α = 1, β = 0). This is a
4consequence of the slow evolution near each of the the
axes α = 0 and β = 1, since the interactions in the popu-
lations along these axes are all of the unconditional self-
ishness type (ΩSS = 1) along α = 0 or cooperation type
(ΩCC = 1) along β = 1. There is no evolutionary drive to
move between different populations possessing the same
statistics of reactions, since they correspond to the same
fitness value (2). Further analysis, therefore, will focus
on the development of communication abilities based on
negatively correlated reactions (α = 1, β = 0), leading to
interesting analogies with real world phenomena.
A population consisting of phenotypes with a single
negatively correlated behavior mode (α = 1, β = 0), is
evolutionary unstable under any weight table Wpq . This
can be demonstrated as follows: an individual of this type
acts against an identical competitor either as a donor or
a recipient with equal probabilities (ΩSC = 0.5,ΩCS =
0.5,ΩSS = ΩCC = 0), receiving an average payoff of
(WSC + WCS)/2. He demonstrates, however, uncondi-
tional cooperation (ΩCS ≈ 1,ΩSC ≈ ΩSS ≈ ΩCC ≈ 0)
or selfishness (ΩSC ≈ 1,ΩCS ≈ ΩSS ≈ ΩCC ≈ 0)
against mutants described by (αj = 1 − ∆α, βj =
0) and by (αj = 1, βj = ∆β) ∆α,∆β ≪ 0, pro-
viding them payoffs WSC and WCS . These abrupt
changes of behavior are a consequence of the instability
of γji(αj , βj , αi, βi) (4) near the point (α = 1, β = 0):
γji(1, 0, 1, 0) = 0.5, lim∆α→0 γji(1, 0, 1 − ∆α, 0) = 0
and lim∆β→0 γji(1, 0, 1,∆β) = 1. Either of the mu-
tants (αj = 1 − ∆α, βj = 0) and (αj = 1, βj = ∆β),
therefore, outperforms the (α = 1, β = 0) host, since
WSC > (WSC + WCS)/2 or WCS > (WSC + WCS)/2.
Consequently, evolutionary stability of negative correla-
tions requires phenotypes composed of at least two dif-
ferent behavior modes.
An example of a population with two behavior modes
possessing evolutionary stability and diversity of com-
munication skills can be constructed as follows (SM
A3 e and A4). The phenotype of an individual A
will include two behavior modes (responsive (R) and
non-responsive (NR)), described by three parameters
(αA, βA, ǫA), where ǫA takes now the meaning of affect
ability. In the course of an interaction, the individuals A
and B possess non-responsive behavior mode (NR) with
probabilities defined by the affect abilities of the com-
petitor, meaning that non-responsive behavior is not a
personal choice, but enforced by the opponent. In case
of A, therefore, 1 − ǫB and ǫB are the probabilities to
act in responsive (R) and non-responsive (NR) modes
correspondingly (Fig. 3). In the non-responsive mode,
an individual behaves stochastically, generating reactions
with probabilities matching the average statistics of its
reactions, and receives no payoff:
WNRpq = 0. (7)
In the responsive mode, its behavior is defined by the
conditional probabilities (α, β), and, therefore, depends
on the reactions of the competitor. The lower the num-
ber of pairwise interactions in this mode, the greater the
weight for each competition:
W˜Rpq ∝
1
1− ǫB ×
C S
C WCC WCS
S WSC WSS
. (8)
The interactions of a population with high affect abili-
ties ǫ→ 1 are composed, therefore, of a small amount (∝
1− ǫ) of evolutionary important competitions with nega-
tively correlated reactions and significant information ex-
change, together with more frequent non-responsive be-
havior lacking any evolutionary gain (Fig. 3).
In such a population, communication abilities will
evolve when Wpq (see 8) fluctuate around the values cor-
responding to games of Chicken, Leader and Battle of
the Sexes (see Fig. 1B and SM A6). No development
occurs either when Wpq do not fluctuate or correspond
to other games, e.g. Prisoner’s Dilemma. To describe
the evolutionary dynamics, the instantaneous state of a
population is defined as a density distribution over the
phenotype space ρ(−→r ) = (α, β, ǫ). The time develop-
ment is governed by the replicator dynamics equations
[46]: it consists of the emergence of mutations due to a
diffusion-like process and redistribution between the old
phenotypes according to natural selection:
∂ρ(−→r )
∂t
= ρ(−→r )F (
−→r )− F
Tgen|F |
+D
∂2ρ
∂−→r 2 , F¯ =
∫
ρ(−→r )F (−→r )d−→r ,
(9)
where F denotes the fitness, F¯ the average fitness, D the
diffusion coefficient of the mutation process and Tgen the
time-span of a single generation. These equations can
be reduced to the local velocities of a population in the
phenotype space (SM A2). In the case of a particle-like
population confined to the vicinity of its average pheno-
type one obtains, taking condition (7) into account:
vα =
|∆α|2
TgenF (
−→r )
∂F (−→r )
∂α
, vβ =
|∆β|2
TgenF (
−→r )
∂F (−→r )
∂β
,
(10)
vǫ ∝ |∆ǫ|
2
TgenF (
−→r )
[
∂F (−→r )
∂α
∂2F (−→r )
∂ǫ∂α
+
∂F (−→r )
∂β
∂2F (−→r )
∂ǫ∂β
]
,
(11)
where |∆α|2, |∆β|2 and |∆ǫ|2 are the spreads of the pop-
ulation along α, β and ǫ directions correspondingly. The
development of affect abilities ǫ depends on the changes
in α and β (vǫ ∝ |(vα, vβ)|). Populations, therefore, can
possess many different values of affect abilities (vǫ = 0
for any value of ǫ) and corresponding information skills
at the stable points vα = vβ = 0, matching the diversity
of communication abilities in nature (see Figs. 4A-4D).
The stronger the fluctuations of the size of a popula-
tion, the faster the development time of communication
abilities in a high affect, negatively correlated behavior
mode: (ǫ→ 1, α = 1, β = 0) (Fig. 4E):
Tdev ∝ Tgen (DTgen)−
3
4
(
∆S
S
)2− 12
, (12)
5since fluctuations of the payoffs Wpq correspond to fluc-
tuations in the size S of a population. The time depen-
dent evolutionary conditions keep the population away
from its stable points (vα = vβ = vǫ = 0), leading
to an increase of the affect abilities (vǫ > 0) and evo-
lutionary stability of the maximum possible informa-
tion exchange in the indirect reciprocity behavior mode
(ǫ → 1, α = 1, β = 0). Chicken and Battle of the Sexes
games possess the fastest development rate of communi-
cation abilities (see Fig. 4F).
The prediction that development of communication is
accelerated with population size variations, is supported
by evidence of significant demographic fluctuations dur-
ing human evolution [25]. In addition, the long time re-
quired to develop multicellularity on Earth (about 75%
of the entire evolution time-span) [47, 48] can be as-
sociated with the slow development of positively corre-
lated synchronous behavior mode (α = 0, β = 1). Nega-
tively correlated reactions of the indirect reciprocity type
(α = 1, β = 0) lack selfish competitions (ΩSS = 0) and
match, therefore, the observations of relatively low ag-
gression levels in humans [49]. From a single interaction’s
perspective, indirect reciprocity can be interpreted as al-
truistic. It allows one to suggest that non-kin altruism,
considered to be a unique human property [50], could be
a by-product of evolution of communication abilities.
The derived conditions are essential for evolution and
diversity of communication (SM A3 e). Deviations from
the scaling of the payoffs per behavior mode (8) (e.g.
scaling per pairwise interactions) destroy the evolution-
ary stability of the high affect, negatively correlated
(ǫ→ 1, α = 1, β = 0) behavior mode. Non-responsive be-
havior with finite, rather than zero (7), payoffs prevents
multi-stability (diversity) of the communication develop-
ment. The inability to affect a competitor to behave in
a specific behavior mode makes evolution of the infor-
mation exchange and processing impossible. The same
statements are valid in the case of multi-behavior mode
phenotypes. Non-diverse (all populations converge to the
same state) development of negative correlations, how-
ever, is possible, raising the question whether there exists
a scheme for evolution of information exchange, which is
different from the emergence of human-like communica-
tion abilities?
The results of this work indicate that development of
artificial life or intelligence may be impossible without
selection rules changing with time. The attempts to cre-
ate artificial evolution of competing digital organisms led
so far to a limited, rather than unbounded, growth of
complexity [51, 52]. Evolution of communication can be
considered as a base for significant complexity growth
in living and artificial systems. The analogies of these
results with human evolution (e.g. presence of demo-
graphic bottlenecks) indicate a promising direction for
the artificial evolution of intelligent systems composed of
communicating agents.
The developed framework does not predict exact mech-
anism for the evolution of communication. Only general
evolutionary conditions are derived that lead to corre-
lated statistics of reactions, assuming that the mecha-
nisms for the necessary information exchange and pro-
cessing can be implemented in various ways and are
species’ dependent.
To conclude, a mathematical framework based on ob-
servable, correlated behavior patterns was developed for
analysis of evolution of information exchange in popu-
lations. It predicts that the communication abilities of
populations are related to negatively correlated interac-
tions (such as donor vs. recipient) and affective behavior.
It was found that fluctuations in population size acceler-
ate significantly the evolution of these abilities, allowing
thus to explain the uniqueness of the human-line evo-
lution. Competitions similar to games of Chicken and
Battle of the Sexes lead to a faster evolution of commu-
nication. An experimental verification of models based
on this framework is in principle possible, since the de-
veloped analytical tools are based on observable param-
eters, such as statistics of mutual reactions during com-
petitions, rather than exact modeling of information ex-
change and decision making biological mechanisms.
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FIG. 1: Evolution as a game. (A) Interaction of individuals A and B, possessing behavior modes mode(A) and mode(B)
correspondingly. A and B generate reactions p and q, receiving payoffs according to tables specific to each mode, e.g. W
mode(A)
pq
is the payoff of A for its reaction p vs. reaction q of its competitor. Indices p and q represent either selfish S or cooperative
C reactions. Different modes correspond to the possible states of the competitors (e.g. age, intra-population rank, sex, ability
to acquire information and etc. . . . ) that determine the individual payoffs W kpq during an interaction. All individuals are
assumed to share the same set of modes k ∈ {1, N}. (B) Classification of payoff values (b, c) according to evolutionary game
theoretical models, assuming that the competing individuals are in the same mode, with payoffs WSS = 0, WSC = b, WCS = c
and WCC = 1. Payoff values within the unmarked areas lack specific names.
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FIG. 2: Correlations of mutual reactions and information exchange in the course of a competition. (A) The strategy of an
individual A in behavior mode i is defined by αi and βi: α denotes the conditional probability of player’s A cooperation
reaction C vs. the selfish reaction S of its competitor B, whereas β denotes the conditional probability for cooperation C vs.
cooperation C of the competitor. Selfishness aversion and cooperation attraction are possible interpretations for α and β. (B)
The statistics Ωijpq for reaction p by A
mode(i) vs. q by Bmode(j) follows from the definitions of α and β (eq. (3)). To determine
the probability ΩijCS of C vs. S interaction, for instance, one must multiply the conditional probability αi of A to cooperate
with a selfish competitor B by the unconditional probability γji of B to provide reaction S during a competition with A. The
values of unconditional probabilities γji and γij follow from symmetry considerations (eq. (4)). (C) Contour plot of information
exchange per interaction I(α, β) in populations consisting of individuals competing in the same mode (α, β). The diagonal
(α = β) together with the axes (α = 0) and (β = 1) correspond to a minimum of 0 bits exchanged per interaction matching the
cases of random mutual reactions, of unconditional cooperation (β = 1|ΩCC = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩSS = 0) and of unconditional
selfishness (α = 0|ΩSS = 1,ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩCC = 0). A maximum of 1 bit per interaction is achieved at the points (α = 0, β =
1) and (α = 1, β = 0) (marked with a
N
), corresponding to the synchronous (ΩSS = 0.5,ΩCC = 0.5,ΩSC = ΩCS = 0) and
indirect reciprocity (ΩSC = 0.5,ΩCS = 0.5,ΩSS = ΩCC = 0) behavior modes. Tiny deviations from the synchronous point
(α = 0, β = 1) will bring the mutual information exchange to 0, due to the very steep gradient of I(α, β) in this region.
9FIG. 3: Essential conditions for evolution and diversity of communication in a population with two behavior modes per
individual. An individual A is either in a non-responsive or a responsive mode, with the probabilities ǫB and 1− ǫB , defined by
the affect ability ǫB of its competitor B. The affect ability ǫ may be considered as an individual’s skill to influence the behavior
of its competitor, enforcing him in this way to behave stochastically. There is zero payoff for non-responsive behavior (Wpq = 0).
The lower the probability to be in responsive mode, the greater the payoff during a competition. In a population with developed
affect abilities (ǫ→ 1), the responsive behavior corresponds to high evolutionary payoffs, but interactions of this type are rare.
In the non-responsive mode an individual generates arbitrary reaction with probabilities matching the average statistics of
its reactions. Non-responsive behavior can be interpreted as a reaction induced by a signal from an arbitrary member of the
population, rather than from a competitor. The reaction in this case matches the statistics of the mean reactions, since the
signal effectively averages over all player’s possible interactions within the population.
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FIG. 4: Development of communication abilities as a consequence of fluctuations in population size. (A) For the population
presented in Fig. 3., the local velocity ~v(ǫ, α, β, b, c) = (vα, vβ , vǫ) defines the instantaneous evolution of a confined population
in the phenotype space (α, β, ǫ). Development of affect abilities vǫ = ∂ǫ/t is proportional to vα and vβ, the changes with time of
selfishness aversion α and cooperation attraction β correspondingly. (B) The vector field of ~v in case of (ǫ = 0.5, b = 1.5, c = 0.5).
A population converges to one of its stable states with vα = vβ = vǫ = 0. Lines and points of convergence are marked in
bold. (C) The stable points (αst, βst) in the case ǫ = 0.5, as a function of the payoffs (b, c). (D) Convergence of a population
towards its stable points for ǫ → 1, as a function of payoffs (b, c). Significant information exchange at the indirect reciprocity
behavior mode (α = 1, β = 0) is stable for Chicken, Leader and Battle of the Sexes games (see Fig. 1B). (E) Development
of communication with time in case of fluctuating payoffs (b = 1.5, c = 0.5,
p
∆b2 =
p
∆c2 ≈
q
(∆S/S)2), where S is size
of the population. Fluctuation of the payoffs (b, c), associated with the fast fluctuations in size of the population
q
(∆S/S)2,
accelerate the development of maximal information exchange at the indirect reciprocity behavior mode (α = 1, β = 0), changing
the corresponding development timescale. (F) Population size fluctuations
q
(∆S/S)2 leading to equal development rate of
I (∂I/∂t ∝ vǫ) at ǫ = 0.5 for different values of payoffs (b, c). For small population size fluctuations the fastest information
exchange rate will occur with Chicken and Battle of the Sexes games.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
FOR A. FEIGEL ”CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATION
ABILITIES WITHIN A SPECIES”
This supplement includes a detailed description of the
analytical results presented in the main text. Analysis of
evolutionary stability of populations with significant in-
formation exchange between its members comes after an
introduction to the evolutionary game theory. The evo-
lutionary conditions required for the development and
diversity of information exchange, as well as the corre-
sponding population dynamics, are derived.
1. Evolutionary game theory
a. Selection rules as a game
In the framework of evolutionary game theory, a com-
petition of two individuals is presented as a game. For
two-reaction games, the selection rules can be presented
by payoff tables:
C S
C WmodeCC W
mode
CS
S WmodeSC W
mode
SS
(A1)
where Wmodepq is the payoff for reaction p made in the
specific behavior mode against a competitor’s reaction q.
We assume that the payoffs of an individual during an in-
teraction depend on its mode, corresponding to different
individual states (e.g. age, intra-population rank, sex,
ability to acquire information and etc. . . . ) affecting the
personal payoffs during an interaction.
Reactions S and C can be defined as selfish and coop-
erative correspondingly, assuming WmodeSS < W
mode
CC .
The total gain G(m,h) of an individual m for an in-
teraction with an individual h is:
G(m,h) =
∑
i,j
Ξ(mi, hj)P (mi|hj |W ipq), (A2)
where Ξ(mi, hi) is the probability for the individual m to
be in the mode i while its competitor h is in the mode j
and P (mi|hj |W ipq) is the payoff of m:
P (mi|hj |W ipq) = ΩSS(mi, hj)W iSS +ΩSC(mi, hj)W iSC +
+ΩCS(mi, hj)W
i
CS +ΩCC(mi, hj)W
i
CC ,
(A3)
where Ωpq(mi, hj) is the probability for individual m in
mode i to provide reaction p against reaction q of its
competitor h in mode j.
The fitness F (m) of an individual m is given by:
F (m) =
∑
h
ρ(h)G(m,h), (A4)
where ρ(h) is the density of individuals h in the popu-
lation and summation goes over all individuals with dis-
tinct properties (phenotypes).
b. Dynamics and evolutionary stability of a population
A population can be defined as a density distribution
ρ(ξ) over all possible phenotypes ξ. The density ρ(ξ),
therefore, corresponds to the relative amount (frequency)
of phenotypes ξ in the population. Evolution of a popula-
tion consists of two processes: redistribution between ex-
isting phenotypes from generation to generation (natural
selection) and emergence of new phenotypes (mutations).
The natural selection is described by the replicator dy-
namics equations [46], assuming that the fitness is a mea-
sure of the progeny:
∂ρ(ξ)
∂t
=
1
Tgen
ρ(ξ)
F (ξ) − F
|F | + M˜, (A5)
where Tgen is the time span of a single generation, F (ξ)
is the evolutionary fitness (A4) of the phenotype ξ and
M˜ is a contribution of mutations to the density ρ(ξ) of
the phenotype ξ. The average fitness F in the population
is:
F =
N∑
ξ=1
ρ(ξ)F (ξ). (A6)
The difference between the fitness F (ξ) and the average
fitness F defines the growth (F (ξ) > F ) or decay (F (ξ) <
F ) of the corresponding phenotype density ρ(ξ).
The evolutionary stable phenotype ξ(st) has maximum
fitness, meaning:
F (ξ(st)) > F (χ), (A7)
for all χ 6= ξ(st). In the case of a population composed of
two phenotypes (mutant and evolutionary stable host),
the condition (A7) reduces to:
G(host, host) > G(mut, host), (A8)
where G(m,h) is the average payoff for an interaction
between phenotypes m and h (see eq. (A2)).
To obtain condition (A8), let us consider a mutant
with a density (ρ(mut) = ∆ρ) invading a population
composed of some host phenotype (ρ(host) = 1 − ∆ρ).
Taking eq. (A4) into account, the finesses of the host and
the mutant are:
F (host) = (1−∆ρ)G(host, host) + ∆ρG(host,mut),
(A9)
F (mut) = (1 −∆ρ)G(mut, host) + ∆ρG(mut,mut).
(A10)
In the limit of ∆ρ << 1, conditions (A7) (F (host) >
F (mut)) and (A8) converge to each other.
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In the case of equality G(host, host) = G(mut, host)
the mutant can become evolutionary beneficial in case
G(host,mut) < G(mut,mut). The population dynamics
in this case is slow, depending on rare (∝ ∆ρ2) mutant
vs. mutant interactions.
2. Evolution of a population as a particle-like
motion
In this work, whenever possible, the evolutionary dy-
namics is going to be considered in the limit of a con-
fined population, composed of a single phenotype with
small variations. We are going to develop the particle-
like equations of motion of such population in the phe-
notype space, under assumption that the mutations (see
(A5)) correspond to a diffusion-like process:
M˜ = D
∂2ρ
∂−→r 2 , (A11)
where D is a diffusion coefficient and −→r is the pheno-
type space coordinate. For small D, mutations cause
only minute changes in the existing phenotypes and a
population remains, therefore, confined during its entire
evolution. The motion of a confined population can be
described by local velocities (a flow field) in the pheno-
type space, similar to the motion of a particle.
The dynamics of a population (eq. (A5)), in case of a
diffusion-like mutation process (eq. (A11)), is described
by:
∂ρ(−→r )
∂t
=
1
Tgen
ρ(−→r )F (
−→r )− F
|F | +D
∂2ρ
∂−→r 2 , (A12)
F (−→r ) =
∫
d−→r ′ρ(−→r ′)G(−→r ,−→r ′), (A13)
F =
∫
d−→r d−→r ′ρ(−→r )ρ(−→r ′)G(−→r ,−→r ′), (A14)
where an instantaneous state of the evolving population
is defined by a density distribution ρ(−→r ) over some N -
dimension phenotype space −→r = (x1, x2, ..., xN ). The
fitness F (−→r ) and the average fitness F are described by
the continuous versions of eqs. (A4) and (A6).
A confined population is described by its spread (size
in the phenotype space) and by its asymmetry along the
direction of the propagation. Its dynamics, therefore,
can be approximated by a δ-function, taking into ac-
count both the spread δ(2) (the second derivative) and
the asymmetry δ(1)(the first derivative):
ρ(−→r , t) = δ(−→r −−→r 0(t)) −
−x(t)δ(1)(−→r −−→r 0(t)) + 1
2
x2(t)δ(2)(−→r −−→r 0(t)),
(A15)
where −→r 0(t) is the location of the population, xi =∫
ρ(xi − x0i) corresponds to the asymmetry and x2i =∫
ρ(xi − x0i)2 contributes to the spread (x2i − xi2).
The velocity of a population ∂
−→r 0
∂t
is:
−→v =
−−→
v1st +
−−→
v2nd, (A16)
where the first
−−→
v1st and the second
−−→
v1st orders are:
v1sti (
−→r ) = 1
Tgen
1
G(−→r ,−→r )
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
(
x2i − xi2
)
, (A17)
v2ndi (
−→r ) = 1
Tgen
1
G(−→r ,−→r ) ×1
2
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
(
x3i − x2ixi
)
+
∑
i6=j
(
x2i − xi2
)
xj
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi∂x′j
+
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi∂xj
)
−
− 1
G(−→r ,−→r )
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xj
+
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′j
)
xj
]
, (A18)
and xni =
∫
ρ(xi − x0i)n. For derivation of eqs. (A17)
and (A18), see section A 8.
The spread
(
x2i − xi2
)
and asymmetry xi are esti-
mated in the limits of slow and fast propagations of the
population in the phenotype space. For derivation of the
following equations see section A9. In the limit of almost
stable population, the spread is defined by diffusion in the
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vicinity of the stable position:
(
x2i − xi2
)
∝ 2
√
−DTgen
(
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
)−1
,
(A19)
xi ∝ −∂G(
−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
(
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
)−1
. (A20)
The population remains confined under condition:
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
< 0. (A21)
In case of a fast propagating population, the spread
is equal to the diffusion during the time that takes the
population to pass its own size:
(
x2i − xi2
)
∝ (DTgen) 23
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
)− 2
3
,(A22)
The corresponding asymmetry of the propagating popu-
lation is:
xi ∝ (DTgen) 13
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
)− 1
3
. (A23)
Diversity (multi-stability) of the dynamics of a con-
fined population requires local stable states −→v = 0 either
since:
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xs
= 0, (A24)
or if further propagation is impossible due to the bound-
aries of the phenotype space:
−−−→
v(−→rb )−→n < 0, (A25)
where −→rb is a point on the boundary of the phenotype
space and −→n is the normal vector to the boundary.
In this work, a special case of:
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xs
=
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2s
= 0, (A26)
is important, in addition to the conditions (A24) and
(A25). The corresponding velocity vs depends entirely
on the evolution in other directions:
v1sts (
−→r ) = 0
v2nds (
−→r ) = 1
Tgen
1
G(−→r ,−→r )
∑
j 6=s
(
x2s − xs2
)
xj
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xs∂x′j
+
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xs∂xj
)
.
(A27)
A population can be stable at many different points along
s, provided that for each value of s there are stable values
for other phenotype coordinates (see (A24)).
The equations for v1sti (
−→r ), v1sti (−→r ),
(
x2i − xi2
)
and xi
define the main properties of the evolutionary dynamics
of a confined population; First, the lowest order contri-
bution
−−→
v1st to the velocity of a population corresponds
to the deviation from stability condition:
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
= 0, (A28)
in case where (A8) holds. Second, the motion in one
direction contributes to the velocities in other directions;
v1stj 6= 0 designates asymmetry along the j direction xj 6=
0 and finite contribution to v2ndi 6= 0 for i 6= j, see eq.
(A18).
3. Evolution of information exchange
The analysis proceeds along the following steps: First,
all possible individual strategies (the phenotype space)
are defined. Second, a special set of the competitions (ta-
bles of payoffs Wpq) is demonstrated to satisfy the evo-
lutionary stability of the phenotypes, corresponding to
the maximum information exchange. Third, mutual af-
fective behavior during a competition and zero payoff for
a non-responsive (stochastic) behavior are demonstrated
to be essential for reasonable evolutionary dynamics and
its diversity (multi-stability). The main result is that
fluctuations of evolutionary conditions accelerate the de-
velopment of information exchange.
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a. Individual phenotypes
In this work, a two-reaction phenotype is composed of
different behavior modes k (k ∈ {1, N}). A specific be-
havior mode is described by a table of payoffs W kpq (see
(A1)) and three parameters (ǫk, αk, βk): an individual
possesses the probabilities ǫk to be involved in a compe-
tition having payoffs W kpq, and conditional probabilities
αk and βk defining its method (strategy) to choose one
of the reactions. The behavior modes differ from each
other by their payoffs W kpq and by the allowed values of
α and β.
Parameters αk and βk define the statistics of reactions
of an individual in mode k against selfishness and cooper-
ation correspondingly: αk and 1−αk are the conditional
probabilities to choose cooperation C and selfish S reac-
tions against the selfish reaction S, while βk and 1 − βk
are the conditional probabilities to choose cooperation C
and selfish S reactions against the cooperation reaction
C.
To take into account affective behavior, additional as-
sumptions are required: First, the parameters (ǫk, αk, βk)
depend on each other, e.g. ǫAk (ǫ
B
j , α
B
j , β
B
j ) indicates that
individual B affects the probability of the individual A
to be in behavior mode k. Second, W kpq can depend on
the probability to be in behavior mode ǫk (frequency de-
pendent payoffs), as in the case of an evolutionary reward
that is divided either across many competitions or during
a major one. The payoffs W kpq, however, are assumed to
be independent of the probabilities α and β.
b. Interaction of two individuals: payoffs
To find the evolutionary payoff (A2) of an individual
m in mode i interacting with an individual h in mode j,
one should calculate the statistics of the mutual reactions
Ωpq(mi, hj) and mutual behavior modes Ξ(mi, hj) during
a competition, as function of the individual parameters
ǫmi , α
m
i , β
m
i and ǫ
h
j , α
h
j , β
h
j .
According to the definition of ǫ:
Ξ(ǫi, αi, βi|ǫj, αj , βj) = ǫiǫj , (A29)
indicating that the probability of a mode i against mode j
competition is the product of the individual probabilities
to be in the modes i and j correspondingly.
To derive the statistics of the mutual reactions
Ωpq(mi, hj) as a function of (αi, βi) and (αj , βj), one
should solve the self-consistent system of equations:
αi =
ΩCS
ΩCS +ΩSS
, αj =
ΩSC
ΩSS +ΩSC
,
βi =
ΩCC
ΩSC +ΩCC
, βj =
ΩCC
ΩCC +ΩCS
,
ΩSS +ΩSC +ΩCS +ΩCC = 1, (A30)
following the definitions of α and β.
Causality makes solution of (A30) in a general case
impossible; in the course of pairwise interactions, simul-
taneous conditional reactions and information exchange
are impossible. The second to respond, therefore, pos-
sesses an advantage by knowing the reaction of the com-
petitor. Exact solution, however, exists for some cases,
turning out to be the most relevant for the evolution of
information exchange (see section A6).
The solution of the system (A30) exists for the case of
(αi, βi) = (αj , βj) and at the boundaries of the (αj , βj)
space: αi,j = 0, 1 or βi,j = 0, 1 (see section A 12). Ac-
cording to the definition of α and β, the solution of (A30)
comes in the form:
ΩSS(ǫi, αi, βi|ǫj , αj , βj) = (1− αi)γji,
ΩSC(ǫi, αi, βi|ǫj , αj , βj) = (1− βi)(1− γji),
ΩCS(ǫi, αi, βi|ǫj , αj , βj) = αiγji,
ΩCC(ǫi, αi, βi|ǫj , αj , βj) = βi(1− γji), (A31)
where γji is the probability of individual j to provide
reaction S during a competition with the individual i. It
follows from the self-consistent (mean field) conditions:
γji = (1− αj)γij + (1− βj)(1 − γij),
γij = (1− αi)γji + (1− βi)(1− γji), (A32)
indicating that probabilities γji and γij correspond to
the same values of Ωpq(mi, hj). Solving this system of
equations results in:
γji =
(1− βj)− (1− βi)(αj − βj)
1− (αi − βi)(αj − βj) . (A33)
In a homogeneous population of identical individuals
(ǫi, αi, βi), eq. (A33) becomes:
γii =
1− β
1 + α− β , (A34)
where γii is independent of ǫi. For derivation of eq.
(A34), see section A13.
The total gain of an individual m in an interaction
with an individual h (see eq. (A2)), becomes:
G(m,h) =
∑
i,j
ǫmi ǫ
h
jP (mi|hj |W ipq), (A35)
where summation goes over all behavior modes i, j. The
payoff for a competition P (mi|hj |W ipq) (A3), taking into
account (A31), becomes:
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P (mi|hj |W ipq) = (1− αmi )γjiW iSS + (1 − βmi )(1− γji)W iSC + . . .
+αmi γjiW
i
CS + β
m
i (1 − γji)W iCC , (A36)
where γji is defined by eq. (A33).
In the general case, Ωpq can be derived as a function
of (αi, βi), (αj , βj), γij , γji and additional parameters
describing causality issues in the course of pairwise in-
teraction. The arrangement to be the first or the second
to respond during a competition can be defined in many
different ways; e.g. it can be random or an individual
with more advanced abilities to process information can
possess an advantage. For instance, in case of equiprob-
able right to be the second to respond, the statistics of
the mutual reactions is:
Ω∗pq(i|j) =
Ωpq(i|j) + Ωpq(j|i)
2
, (A37)
where Ωpq(i|j) corresponds to (A31). Fortunately, the
main conclusions of this work are independent of the spe-
cific choice of the causality mechanism.
c. Information exchange of two identical individuals
An amount of information must be transferred between
two interacting strangers to allow correlated, rather than
random, mutual reactions. Information exchange be-
tween two interacting individuals follows from the statis-
tics of the mutual reactions Ωpq:
I =
∑
p,q=S,C
[
Ωpq log2
(
Ωpq
(ΩpS +ΩpC)(ΩSq +ΩCq)
)]
,
(A38)
under assumption that no information is shared prior to
the interaction.
To derive information exchange per behavior mode,
one should substitute eqs. (A34) and (A31) into eq.
(A38), assuming that the individuals compete in the
same mode (αi, βi) = (αj , βj) = (α, β). The correspond-
ing statistics of mutual reactions (A31) is:
ΩSS = (1 − α)γ, ΩCC = β(1 − γ)
ΩCS = αγ, ΩSC = (1− β)(1 − γ), (A39)
where, according to eq. (A34) γ is:
γ =
1− β
1 + α− β , (A40)
and index i is omitted as unnecessary in this case.
Substitution of eqs. (A39) and (A40) into eq. (A38)
results in:
I = (1− α)γ log2
(
(1− α)γ
γ2
)
+ (1− β)(1 − γ) log2
(
(1− β)(1 − γ)
γ(1− γ)
)
+ . . .
+αγ log2
(
αγ
(1− γ)γ
)
+ β(1 − γ) log2
(
β(1− γ)
(1− γ)2
)
, (A41)
taking into account that for p, q = S:
ΩpS +ΩpC = ΩSq +ΩCq = γ, (A42)
and, in case of p, q = C
ΩpS +ΩpC = ΩSq +ΩCq = 1− γ, (A43)
since these summations correspond to the unconditional
probabilities to provide either selfish or cooperative reac-
tions (see Fig. 2B).
The expression (A41) can be reduced by symbolic ma-
nipulations to:
I = log2
(
(1− α)(1−α)γ(1 − β)(1−β)(1−γ)ααγββ(1−γ)
γγ(1− γ)γ
)
,
(A44)
where γ corresponds to (A40).
The main properties of information exchange (A44) are
presented in Fig. 2C. I varies from 0 to 1 bit, describ-
ing a binary reaction. The maximal transfer (1 bit per
interaction) corresponds to the indirect reciprocity (IR)
(α = 1, β = 0) and synchronous (α = 0, β = 1) behav-
ior modes. No information transfer is required in cases
of random reactions (α = β), homogeneous cooperation
(β = 1) and selfishness (α = 0).
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d. Instability of the indirect reciprocity and extremely slow
development of synchronization in populations with a single
behavior mode
The main result of this section is that at least two be-
havior modes are required to evolve significant informa-
tion exchange. In populations composed of individuals
with a single behavior mode (α, β), indirect reciprocity
(α = 1, β = 0) is always unstable and an infinite time is
required to develop the synchronization (α = 0, β = 1).
A population composed of a host with a single indi-
rect reciprocity behavior mode (α = 1, β = 0), is al-
ways unstable either toward α (α = 1−∆α, β = 0) or β
(α = 1, β = ∆β) mutants. An individual (αi = 1, βi = 0)
expresses unconditional selfishness γji = 0 or coopera-
tion γji = 1 against mutants (αj = 1 − ∆α, βj = 0)
and (αj = 1, βj = ∆β) (∆α,∆β ≪ 0) correspondingly,
though possesses γii = 0.5 for interaction with an identi-
cal individual:
γji(α = 1, β = 0|α = 1, β = 0) = γii(1, 0) = 1
2
, (A45)
lim
∆α→0
γji(α = 1, β = 0|α = 1−∆α, β = 0) = 0 (A46)
lim
∆β→0
γji(α = 1, β = 0|α = 1, β = ∆β) = 1, (A47)
The corresponding payoffs (A3) are (taking into account
eqs. (A45),(A46),(A47) and (A31)):
G(h, h) = (WSC +WCS)/2, (A48)
G(mα, h) =WSC , (A49)
G(mβ , h) =WCS , (A50)
One of the mutants, therefore, possesses a payoff greater
than the host, since either:
WSC > (WSC +WCS)/2, (A51)
or:
WCS > (WSC +WCS)/2. (A52)
Consequently, indirect reciprocity can not develop in
populations with a single behavior mode, since the con-
dition (A8) is always broken.
The stability of synchronous population is ill-defined:
it can be stable, though requires infinite time to develop.
Populations with α = 0 are identical with homogeneous
reactions S vs. S, while populations with β = 1 are iden-
tical with homogeneous reactions C vs. C. The dynamics
near these axes are very slow, since there is no evolution-
ary benefit for transfer between two identical states. A
population, therefore, can be stacked in the vicinity of
the synchronous mode (α = 0, β = 1) but is unable to
reach it.
e. Stability and diversity of indirect reciprocity
Consider a population composed of individuals, pos-
sessing several behavior modes (ǫk, αk, βk) (k = 1..N).
The main goal is to find the evolutionary conditions
(payoffs W kpq , mechanisms of affective behavior and con-
straints on the exchange of information) required for
the development and stability of the indirect reciprocity
mode (αIR = 1, βIR = 0). An additional requirement
is the diversity of the evolutionary dynamics, meaning
that multiple stable states of a population exist under
the same evolutionary conditions.
We will demonstrate that stability of the indirect reci-
procity requires greater evolutionary payoff for the less
frequent pairwise interactions. The individual payoff
W IRpq for a pairwise interaction, must be inversely pro-
portional to ǫIR, the probability of the individual to be
found in the indirect reciprocity mode:
W IRpq ∝
1
ǫIR
. (A53)
In this case, the table of payoffs (A1) is:
1
ǫmode
×
C S
C WmodeCC W
mode
CS
S WmodeSC W
mode
SS
, (A54)
where Wmodepq corresponds to the possible evolutionary
payoff for a such behavioral mode.
Condition (A53) is essential for evolutionary stabil-
ity of the indirect reciprocity mode (αh1 = 1, β
h
1 =
0) in a population (ǫhk , α
h
k , β
h
k ) against either (α
m
1 =
1 − ∆α, βm1 = 0) or (αm1 = 1, βm1 = ∆β) mutants,
∆α,∆β ≪ 1. The corresponding conditions of the evolu-
tionary stability (A8) are (see section A 10), for the case
of (αm1 = 1−∆α, βm1 = 0):
ǫ21
W 1CS −W 1SC
2
+ ∆αǫ1B > 0, (A55)
and for the case (αm1 = 1, β
m
1 = −∆β):
ǫ21
W 1SC −W 1CS
2
+ ∆βǫ1D > 0, (A56)
under assumption that ǫh1 = ǫ
m
1 = ǫ1 and keeping only
the first order terms of ∆α and ∆β. Inequalities (A55)
and (A56) can not hold simultaneously without condition
(A53); the terms ∝ ǫ21 are dominant and possess opposite
signs.
Under condition (A53), the expressions (A55) and
(A56) become:
ǫ1
W 1CS −W 1SC
2
+ ∆αB˜ > 0, (A57)
ǫ1
W 1SC −W 1CS
2
+ ∆βD˜ > 0, (A58)
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taking into account that both B and D are proportional
to W 1pq (see section A10). In the case ǫ1 → 0, (A57)
and (A58) converge to ∆αB˜ and ∆βD˜ correspondingly.
The stability of the indirect reciprocity behavior mode is,
therefore, possible when the probability to be in such a
mode is low (ǫIR → 0, αIR = 1, βIR = 0) and B˜, D˜ > 0.
A scaling of the payoffsWpq ∝ ǫλ, λ 6= −1 (different from
(A53)) either prevents stability of the indirect reciprocity
mode (λ > −1) or makes the expression for evolutionary
gain (A35) to diverge (λ < −1).
Stability analysis of the indirect reciprocity mode
(ǫIR → 0, αIR = 1, βIR = 0) against (ǫ1 = 1 −∆ǫ, αm1 =
1, βm1 = 0) mutants, brings no significant confinements on
the required evolutionary conditions; this mode is stable
for changes in ǫ under quite general choice of payoffs.
Affective behavior is required to allow for the develop-
ment of the indirect reciprocity behavior mode (ǫIR →
0, αIR = 1, βIR = 0). The condition (A53) suggests two
different interpretations of the parameter ǫi, either as an
individual probability to be in mode i or as a probability
to affect the competitor to behave in mode i. The cor-
responding payoff for an individual (αi, βi, ǫi) competing
against (αj , βj , ǫj) is:
G(A,B) =
∑
ij
ǫBj P (α
A
i , β
A
i |αBj , βBj |W ipq), (A59)
or, in case of affective behavior:
G(A,B) =
∑
ij
ǫAi P (α
A
i , β
A
i |αBj , βBj |W ipq), (A60)
In the limit of ǫh = ǫm these interpretations are indis-
tinguishable. The development of ǫIR → 0, required for
the stability of the indirect reciprocity, is impossible in
case of (A59); vǫ = 0, since derivatives for any order n
vanish, ∂nG(−→ri ,−→rj )/∂ǫni = 0 (see (A17) and(A18)). Con-
sequently, affective behavior (A60) is essential to ensure
evolutionary dynamics of a confined population subjected
to condition (A53).
Diversity requires the existence of at least two different
modes (e.g. mode 1 and mode 2), that in interaction with
an arbitrary mode i will provide an equal payoff:
P (αi, βi|α1, β1|W ipq) = P (αi, βi|α2, β2|W ipq). (A61)
The multi-stability along ǫ1 direction requires:
∂G(m,h)
∂ǫm1
= 0, (A62)
for multiple values of ǫ1. Diversity along α and β direc-
tions does not occur unless the weights Wpq depend on
α and β. Condition (A61) follows from eq. (A60) and
ǫ2 = 1−
∑
j 6=2 ǫj :
∂G(m,h)
∂ǫm1
=
∑
i
(P (αi, βi|α1, β1|W ipq)−P (αi, βi|α2, β2|W ipq)),
(A63)
taking into account (A62) and assuming W ipq to be inde-
pendent for different i. The modes 1 and 2 have to be
linked by some permanent constraint to ensure condition
(A61).
The condition for diversity (A61) holds if for any i, ei-
ther γ1i = γ2i (assuming the payoffs P defined by (A36))
or W ipq = 0. For instance, in case of only two behav-
ior modes: responsive (R) and non-responsive (NR), the
non-responsive mode may correspond to stochastic be-
havior with reaction statistics γR matching the reaction
statistics of the individual in mode (R):
αNR = βNR = 1− γR, (A64)
leading to:
P (αR, βR|αR, βR|WRpq)− . . .
−P (αR, βR|αNR, βNR|WRpq) = 0. (A65)
Zero payoff for non-responsive behavior:
WNRpq = 0, (A66)
is required to ensure:
P (αNR, βNR|αR, βR|WNRpq )− . . .
−P (αNR, βNR|αNR, βNR|WNRpq ) = 0, (A67)
since the payoffs can not be the same for an interactions
with (responsive vs. non-responsive) and without (non-
responsive vs. non-responsive) information transfer. Di-
versity is preserved in the case of many behavior modes
under condition that an individual’s non-responsive be-
havior depends on the competitor’s mode i, matching the
average statistics of reactions against this specific behav-
ior mode.
The condition (A64) possesses a reasonable interpreta-
tion and brings no additional parameters to the model,
contrary to other possibilities to explain the required in-
distinguishability of the two different modes (A61). The
non-responsive behavior can be associated with reactions
induced by an arbitrarymember of the population, rather
than by the opponent. In this case the probability of a
specific reaction matches the average reaction statistics
of the individual.
4. Evolution of information exchange in a
population with two behavior modes
Let us consider an example of a population composed
of individuals with two behavior modes: non-responsive
(R) and responsive (NR), and subjected to the condi-
tions (A53), (A61) and (A64). The corresponding indi-
vidual phenotype consists of three parameters: selfish-
ness aversion α, cooperation attraction β and ability of
affect ǫ. In the responsive mode, α and 1 − α are the
probabilities to choose cooperation C and selfish S reac-
tions against the competitor’s selfish reaction S, while β
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and 1 − β are the probabilities to choose cooperation C
and selfish S reactions against the competitor’s coopera-
tion reaction C. In the non-responsive mode it generates
selfish and cooperative reactions with probabilities γ and
1−γ correspondingly, where γ is the individual probabil-
ity to be in state S averaged over all (both non-responsive
and responsive) interactions. Ability of affect ǫ is the
probability to put a competitor into its non-responsive
mode.
The evolutionary payoffs for each behavior mode are
described by the tables of payoffs (A1). There is no pay-
off for non-responsive behavior WNR = 0. The weight
table for responsive mode WR can be reduced to a two
parameter form (see section A11):
C S
C 1 c
S b 0
, (A68)
when the average fitness in the population is:
F¯ ≈ 1. (A69)
This condition corresponds to a population that is almost
stable in size, since the fitness is a measure of the progeny.
The fluctuations of payoffs b and c correspond to the
short time fluctuations in the size of a population S:
∆c2,∆b2 ∝
(
∆S
S
)2
. (A70)
In case of non-zero sum game the population size changes
with time, and the fluctuations are, therefore, relative to
the average growth rate of the population.
a. Dynamics
This section demonstrates that development of infor-
mation exchange requires payoffs b and c to fluctuate.
Otherwise, the population converges to one of its stable
points with affect ability ǫ 6= 0, far from the indirect reci-
procity mode. The motion of the population, as a con-
sequence of these fluctuations, makes the development of
the affect ability ǫ→ 1 and stability of the indirect reci-
procity mode (ǫIR → 1, αIR = 1, βIR = 0) possible. The
evolution of information exchange occurs in the vicinity
of the stable points, in case the fluctuations of b and c
are small.
Consider a population composed of phenotypes
(ǫi, αi, βi), with corresponding densities ρi(ǫi, αi, βi).
The payoff (A60) for an individual i interacting with an
individual j is:
G(i, j) = (1− ǫi)P (αi, βi|γji|W ipq) +
+ǫiP (αi, βi|γj |W ipq), (A71)
where γji (A33) and γj are the probabilities of individ-
ual j to provide reaction S in its responsive and non-
responsive behavior modes correspondingly. The payoff
P according to eq. (A36) becomes:
P (α, β|γ|Wpq) = αγc+(1−β)(1−γ)b+β(1−γ), (A72)
taking (A68) into account.
The probability γi follows from the self-consistent sys-
tem of equations similar to eqs. (A32):
γi =
∑
j
[(1− ǫj)ρj((1 − αi)γji + (1− βi)(1− γji)) + ǫjρj((1 − αi)γj + (1− βi)(1 − γj)] ,
(A73)
averaging individual probability to be in state S over
all pairwise interactions. In a homogeneous population
(ǫ, α, β):
γj = γji =
1− β
1 + α− β , (A74)
indicating that the non-responsive and responsive behav-
iors are indistinguishable from each other. For derivation
of eq. (A74), see section A13.
The motion of a confined population is derived by sub-
stituting the individual gain (A71) into the equations for
the velocity of the population (A17) and (A27). The first
order v1stǫ vanishes:
v1stǫ (ǫ, α, β) ∝ P (αi, βi|γj |W ipq)− P (αi, βi|γji|W ipq) = 0,
(A75)
since γj = γji in this limit (A74). The local velocity of a
population −→v = (v1stα , v1stβ , v2ndǫ ), is defined by:
v1stα (ǫ, α, β) =
1
Tgen
(x2α − xα2)×[
∂P (i|j)
∂αi
+ (1− ǫi)∂P (i|j)
∂γji
∂γji
∂αi
]
,
(A76)
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v1stβ (ǫ, α, β) =
1
Tgen
(x2β − xβ2)×[
∂P (i|j)
∂βi
+ (1− ǫi)∂P (i|j)
∂γji
∂γji
∂βi
]
,
(A77)
v2ndǫ (ǫ, α, β) = −
1
Tgen
(x2ǫ − xǫ2)
∂P (i|j)
∂γji
×[
∂γji
∂αi
xα +
∂γji
∂αj
xα+
+
∂γji
∂βi
xβ +
∂γji
∂βj
xβ
]
, (A78)
where all derivatives are taken at the point (ǫ, α, β) =
(ǫi, αi, βi) = (ǫj , αj , βj). The velocity is proportional to
the spreads (x2k−x2k) and to asymmetries xβ (k = ǫ, α, β)
of the population (see section A2). For derivation of eqs.
(A75), (A76), (A77) and (A78), see section A14.
The payoff P (i|j) is defined by eq. (A36) only at the
boundaries (α = 0, 1) or (β = 0, 1). In other regions of
(α, β) the space eqs. (A31) are invalid; to calculate the
statistics of the mutual reactions Ωpq, the exact order
of reactions in a course of the interaction must be taken
into account, e.g see (A37). The velocities (vα, vβ , vǫ) for
arbitrary (α, β) are calculated by substituting the payoff
P (i|j) in its general form (A3) into eqs. (A17) and (A27).
5. Evolutionary stable states on the boundaries
A confined population on the boundary of the (ǫ, α, β)
space is evolutionary stable in case of:∣∣v‖∣∣ = 0, (A79)
∂v‖
∂x‖
< 0, (A80)
−→v⊥−→n < 0, (A81)
where (v‖, v⊥) are the components of the velocity par-
allel and perpendicular to the boundary, while −→n is the
normal vector at the boundary. The position of a stable
point (αst, βst), defined by conditions (A79) and (A80),
is independent of the order of reactions in the course of
an interaction, since there exists a solution for (A31) at
the boundary of the phenotype space. To analyze (A81)
the equiprobable order of reactions is assumed (A37).
The evolutionary stable points for payoffs b > 0 and
b > c, following (A79) and (A76), are (see section A15):
αst =
−(1− ǫ) +
√
(1− ǫ)2 + 4ǫK2
2ǫK
,
βst = 0, (A82)
where K = c/b.
For payoffs b > 1 and b < c one obtains, following
(A79) and (A77), the stable points:
αst = 0,
βst =
−(−2 + (1− ǫ)(1− Z))−
√
(−2 + (1− ǫ)(1 − Z))2 − 4ǫ(1− ǫ)Z
2ǫ
,
(A83)
where Z = (c− 1)/(b− 1)− 1.
For other payoffs (b, c), a population is stable at some
arbitrary point on either α = 0 or β = 1 plane. The
evolutionary dynamics in the vicinity of these planes is
slow and the stability position is undefined, since
∣∣v‖∣∣ = 0
holds for all points.
In case of developed affect abilities ǫ→ 1, the indirect
reciprocity behavior mode is stable for the region (b >
1, c > 0), including Chicken, Leader and Battle of the
Sexes games. Prisoner’s Dilemma degrades information
exchange. These results are illustrated in Fig. 4.
6. Games favoring development and degradation of
information exchange.
The individual ability to exchange information in-
creases with the development of affect ability ǫ. Stability
of the indirect reciprocity behavior mode is achieved only
at ǫ → 1. Consequently, the evolutionary conditions fa-
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voring and degrading information exchange correspond
to the positive and negative values of vǫ (A78).
Small fluctuations of the payoffs b and c induce motion
in the vicinity of the stable points, with the average vǫ ∝
∆c2,∆b2:
vǫ =
1
2
∂2vǫ(ǫ, α, β, b, c)
∂c2
∣∣∣∣
αst,βst,b,c
∆c2 +
1
2
∂2vǫ(ǫ, α, β, b, c)
∂b2
∣∣∣∣
αst,βst,b,c
∆b2, (A84)
under assumption that ∆b,∆c = 0. In case of constant
payoffs b and c, a population converges to a stable point
with vǫ = 0 (see (A78)).
Information exchange is favored (vǫ > 0) in the
Chicken, Battle of the Sexes and Leader games ((b >
0, c < b) and (b > 1, c > b)). The evolutionary dynamics,
therefore, occurs in the vicinity of the evolutionary stable
points on the axis β = 0 or α = 1. For the (b > 0, c < b)
region, the development rate vǫ follows from eqs. (A84)
and (A78):
vǫ(ǫ, α, β) = − ∆p
2
2Tgen
(x2ǫ − xǫ2)
[
∂2
∂c2
+
∂2
∂b2
]
×
∂G(i, j)
∂αi
(
∂2G(i, j)
∂α2i
)−1
∂P (i|j)
∂γji
(
∂γji
∂αi
+
∂γji
∂αj
)
,
(A85)
and for (b > 1, c > b) one obtains:
vǫ(ǫ, α, β) = − ∆p
2
2Tgen
(x2ǫ − xǫ2)×
∂G(i, j)
∂βi
(
∂2G(i, j)
∂β2i
)−1
∂P (i|j)
∂γji
(
∂γji
∂βi
+
∂γji
∂βj
)
,
(A86)
where ∆p2 ≈ ∆b2,∆c2. The asymmetries of a population
xi are estimated along the boundaries according to (A20)
and in the perpendicular direction according to (A23).
The asymmetries x⊥ are neglected since (DTgen)
1
3 ≪ 1,
in the limit of small D.
The size of the of the population (x2ǫ − xǫ2) along the
ǫ direction is estimated as a diffusion distance during a
time Tk that takes for a population to pass its own size
along the α or β directions. It results in:
(x2ǫ − xǫ2) ∝ (DTgen)
3
4
(
∆p2
)− 1
2
(
−∂2G(i,j)
∂k2
i
) 1
4√(
∂2G(i,j)
∂k∂c
)2
+
(
∂2G(i,j)
∂k∂b
)2 ,
(A87)
where index k is either α or β. This equation fol-
lows from (x2ǫ − xǫ2) ∝ DTk, taking into account Tk =√
(x2k − xk2)/|vk|, where |vk| is the absolute average ve-
locity of a population subjected to fluctuating payoffs
(b, c) near its stable point:
|vk| =
(
∆p2
) 1
2
Tgen
(
x2k − xik
)
×∣∣∣∣[ ∂∂c + ∂∂b
]
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣ , (A88)
see eq. (A17).
The contour plot of payoff fluctuations ∆p2 causing
equal development rate vǫ (A86) at different points of
the payoff space (b, c) (with ǫ = 0.5) is shown in Fig. 4F.
7. Information exchange vs. time
The development rate of information exchange in-
creases with fluctuations of payoffs b and c, correspond-
ing to fast fluctuations of the population size (∆S/S)2.
Maximum information exchange I in a population de-
pends on the affect ability ǫ, together with the payoffs b
and c. Consequently, the instantaneous development of
the information exchange is:
∂I
∂t
=
∂I
∂ǫ
vǫ(ǫ, α, β, b, c), (A89)
under assumption that the average values of b and c are
constant. Taking into account eqs. (A85), (A86) and
(A87), one can write:
∂I
∂t
∝ 1
Tdev
f(ǫ, b, c), (A90)
where f specifies the population under discussion. The
time of development of information exchange and pro-
cessing Tdev:
Tdev ∝ Tgen(DTgen)− 34
((
∆S
S
)2)− 12
, (A91)
is inversely proportional to the diffusion coefficientD and
to population size fluctuations
√
(∆S/S)2, and propor-
tional to the time-span of a single generation Tgen.
8. Derivation of eqs. (A17) and (A18)
We are looking for a δ-function like solution (A15) of
eq. (A12). In a moving frame of reference (−→r ← −→r −−→v t, t← t), eq. (A12) becomes:
−−→v ∂ρ(
−→r )
∂−→r +
∂ρ(−→r )
∂t
=
1
Tgen
ρ(−→r )F (
−→r )− F
|F | +D
∂2ρ
∂−→r 2 .
(A92)
where −→v is the velocity of the frame of reference.
To derive the ith component of the velocity vi, one
should multiply eq. (A92) by the orders of xi (where−→x = −→r − −→r 0) and integrate over the entire phenotype
space−→r . The equations corresponding to the orders from
x0i to x
3
i are:
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0 =
1
Tgen
F (r0)− F
F
+
1
TgenF
×(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk
xk +
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k
x′k+
+
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂xj
xkxj +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂x′j
xkx′j +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k∂x
′
j
x′kx
′
j
)
,
(A93)
vi +
∂xi
∂t
=
1
Tgen
F (r0)− F
F
xi +
1
TgenF
×(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk
xkxi +
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k
x′kxi+
+
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂xj
xkxjxi +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂x′j
xkx′jxi +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k∂x
′
j
x′kx
′
jxi
)
,
(A94)
2vixi +
∂x2i
∂t
= 2D +
1
Tgen
F (r0)− F
F
x2i +
1
TgenF
×(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk
xkx2i +
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k
x′kx
2
i+
+
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂xj
xkxjx2i +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂x′j
xkx′jx
2
i +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k∂x
′
j
x′kx
′
jx
2
i
)
,
(A95)
3vix2i +
∂x3i
∂t
= 6Dxi +
1
Tgen
F (r0)− F
F
x3i +
1
TgenF
×(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk
xkx3i +
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k
x′kx
3
i+
+
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂xj
xkxjx3i +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xk∂x′j
xkx′jx
3
i +
1
2
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′k∂x
′
j
x′kx
′
jx
3
i
)
.
(A96)
The velocities of a confined population (eqs. (A17) and
(A18)) follow from eqs. (A93-A96), under assumptions:
∂xi
∂t
=
∂x2i
∂t
=
∂x3i
∂t
= 0, (A97)
that the population is static in the moving frame of ref-
erence.
To derive the components of the velocity v1sti (A17)
and v2ndi (A18), one should multiply eq. (A93) by xi and
subtract it from eq. (A94). The other terms vanish, e.g
xkxj − xkxj = 0 unless k = j. The last term of the ex-
pression for v2ndi (A18) is a consequence of contributions
to the average fitness F :
F = G(−→r ,−→r ) + ∂G(
−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
xi +
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x′i
x′i,
(A98)
by the asymmetry of the population shape, xi, x′i 6= 0.
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9. Derivation of eqs. (A19), (A20), (A22) and
(A23)
At slow propagation, the spread of a population(
x2i − xi2
)
(A19) follows from eq. (A95), after subtrac-
tion of eq. (A93) multiplied by x2i :
2D = − 1
Tgen
1
2
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
(
x4i − x2i
2
)
, (A99)
where the population was assumed to be near its stable
position: (
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
)2
≪
∣∣∣∣∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)∂x2i
∣∣∣∣ , (A100)
DT ≪
∣∣∣∣∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)∂x2i
∣∣∣∣ , (A101)
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
< 0, (A102)
and vi was neglected. In case of a δ-function like ρ(
−→r ),
condition: (
x2i − xi2
)2
∝
(
x4i − x2i
2
)
, (A103)
is assumed to hold.
The asymmetry (A20) is derived by substitutingD (eq.
(A99)) and v1sti (eq. (A17)) into eq. (A96), after sub-
traction of (eq. (A93) multiplied by x3i :
xi = −∂G(
−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
(
∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂x2i
)−1 (3x2i 2 − xi4)(
−2x4i + 32x2i
2
) ,
(A104)
where terms higher than x4i where neglected. Eq. (A104)
corresponds to eq. (A20), taking into account:(
3x2i
2 − xi4
)
(
−2x4i + 32x2i
2
) → const < 0, (A105)
in the limit of a δ-function like ρ(−→r ).
The spread (A22) in case of fast propagation:(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
)2
≫
∣∣∣∣∂2G(−→r ,−→r ′)∂x2i
∣∣∣∣ ,
(A106)
is estimated as the diffusion radius:(
x2i − xi2
)
≈ DTcr, (A107)
during an amount of time:
Tcr =
√(
x2i − xi2
)
|vi| , (A108)
required for a population to pass its own size. The spread
as a function of D and derivatives of the gain P follows
from (A107), taking into account eqs. (A17) and (A108):(
x2i − xi2
)
∝ D
2
v2f
,
(A109)
where velocity vf is:
vf = (Tgen)
− 1
3 (D)
2
3
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xf
) 1
3
. (A110)
Asymmetry (A23) is estimated from eq. (A95), as D/vi:
xi ∝ (DTgen) 13
(
∂G(−→r ,−→r ′)
∂xi
)− 1
3
, (A111)
taking into account (A106).
10. Derivation of eqs. (A55) and (A56).
To derive eq. (A55), consider a population com-
posed of a host h and a mutant m, with the phenotypes
(ǫhi , α
h
i , β
h
i ) and (ǫ
m
i , α
m
i , β
m
i ) correspondingly. The con-
dition (A55) follows from the stability condition (A8):
G(h, h)−G(m,h) > 0, (A112)
under assumption that only the host possesses a devel-
oped indirect reciprocity mode (αh1 = 1, β
h
1 = 0), while
the mutant is different from the host by its aggression
aversion (αm1 = 1 − ∆α, βm1 = 0). All other behavior
modes are identical:
(ǫhi , α
h
i , β
h
i ) = (ǫ
m
i , α
m
i , β
m
i ), (A113)
for all i 6= 1.
The condition for evolutionary stability (A112) be-
comes:∑
i,j
ǫiǫj
(
P (hi|hj |W ipq)− P (mi|hj |W ipq)
)
> 0,(A114)
taking into account the payoffs (A35). The terms with
i 6= 1 and j 6= 1 vanish due to (A113). The first term of
(A55) corresponds to i = j = 1 terms of (A114):
ǫ21
(
P (α = 1, β = 0|α = 1, β = 0|W 1pq)− . . .
−P (α = 1−∆α, β = 0|α = 1, β = 0|W 1pq)
)
= . . .
= ǫ21
W 1CS −W 1SC
2
, (A115)
23
in the limit of ∆α ≪ 1. The difference of the payoffs
in eq. (A115) converges to a finite value in the limit
∆α→ 1 as consequence of the instability of the behavior
in the indirect reciprocity mode, see eqs. (A45-A52). The
second term of (A55) follows from:∑
j 6=1
ǫ1ǫj
(
P (α = 1, β = 0|αj , βj |W 1pq)− . . .
−P (α = 1−∆α, β = 0|αj , βj |W 1pq)
) ∝ ǫ1∆α.
(A116)
This sum is proportional to ∆α, since there are no insta-
bilities in behavior for any (αj , βj) 6= (1, 0) interacting
with the modes (α = 1, β = 0) and (α = 1−∆α, β = 0).
The condition (A56) follows in the same way as (A55)
assuming (αm1 = 1, β
m
1 = ∆β), rather than the (α
m
1 =
1−∆α, βm1 = 0), mutant.
11. Derivation of eq. (A68).
For an average fitness (A6) F ≈ 1, two independent
parameters are sufficient to describe the payoffs for re-
sponsive behavior in a population composed of individ-
uals with two behavior modes. Reduction of the payoff
(A1) to a two parameter form introduces only a new time
scale in the equation of motion (A5), without having any
impact on its evolutionary dynamics.
To derive the table (A68) from (A1), two transforma-
tions are required:
W ′pq =Wpq −WSS , (A117)
W ′′pq =W
′
pq/(WCC −WSS). (A118)
Consequently, the parameters b and c in (A68) are:
b =
WSC −WSS
WCC −WSS ,
c =
WCS −WSS
WCC −WSS . (A119)
The transformation (A118) applied to eq. ((A5)) results
in:
∂ρ(ξ)
∂t
=
1
Tgen
ρ(ξ)
F (ξ|W ′pq)− F (W ′pq)
|F | + M˜, (A120)
This follows from:
F (Wpq) = F (W
′
pq) +WSS ,
F (Wpq) = F (W
′
pq) +WSS , (A121)
due to the property of the payoff (A3):
P (mi|hj |Wpq) = P (mi|hj |W ′pq) +WSS , (A122)
taking into account that
∑
pq Ωpq = 1.
The second transformation (A118) brings eq. (A120)
to the form:
∂ρ(ξ)
∂t′
=
1
Tgen
ρ(ξ)
(
F (ξ|W ′′pq)− F (W ′′pq)
)
+ M˜, (A123)
where:
t′ = t
WCC −WSS
F¯
, (A124)
and
W ′′pq =
C S
C 1 c
S b 0
, (A125)
corresponding to eq. (A68).
12. Solution of the system of eqs. (A30).
The system of eqs. (A30) can be presented as:
α1 0 α1 − 1 0
α2 α2 − 1 0 0
0 β1 0 β1 − 1
0 0 β2 β2 − 1
1 1 1 1

 ΩSSΩSCΩCS
ΩCC
 =

0
0
0
0
1
 .
(A126)
A solution for this system exists if the determinant of the
corresponding extended matrix U vanishes:
detU = 0, (A127)
where
U =

α1 0 α1 − 1 0 0
α2 α2 − 1 0 0 0
0 β1 0 β1 − 1 0
0 0 β2 β2 − 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
 . (A128)
For a general case there is no solution, since it includes
five equations and only four variables.
The determinant of U :
detU(α1, β1, α2, β2) =
α1(β1 − 1)β2 + α2(α1β2 − β1(α1 + β2 − 1)).
(A129)
vanishes either in case of identical phenotypes (α1, β1) =
(α2, β2) or at the boundaries of the (α, β) space, α = 0, 1
or β = 0, 1. It can be demonstrated as follows:
detU(α, β, α, β) = 0, (A130)
Then taking into account (A130), α2 6= α1 fits (A127) if:
∂ detU
∂α2
∣∣∣∣
α1,2=α,β1,2=β
= β(1 − β), (A131)
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vanishes. The same holds for changes in β2:
∂ detU
∂β2
∣∣∣∣
α1,2=α,β1,2=β
= −α(1− α). (A132)
The solution (A31) is valid in these cases and can be
checked by a substitution.
13. Derivation of eqs. (A34) and (A74).
In a homogenous population composed of individuals
(ǫ, α, β), the average probability γNR of the selfish reac-
tion S is:
γNR = ǫ
2γNR + ǫ(1− ǫ)γNR + . . .
+(1− ǫ)ǫγR,NR + (1− ǫ)2γR,R, (A133)
where one averages over all possible interactions: non-
responsive vs. non-responsive, non-responsive vs. re-
sponsive, responsive vs. non-responsive and responsive
vs. responsive. The probabilities to provide reaction
S while interacting with non-responsive and responsive
competitors are:
γR,NR = (1− α)γNR + (1 − β)(1− γNR), (A134)
and
γR,R =
1− β
1 + α− β , (A135)
correspondingly.
Solution of eq. (A133) for γNR, results in eq. (A74).
14. Derivation of eqs. (A75), (A76), (A77) and
(A78).
These equations are derived substituting the gain
G(i, j) (A71) in expressions (A17) and (A27). One must
take into account that:
∂G(i|j)
∂αi
=
∂P (i|j)
∂αi
+ (1− ǫi)∂P (i|j)
∂γji
∂γji
∂αi
, (A136)
and
∂2G(i|j)
∂ǫi∂αi
= −∂P (i|j)
∂γji
∂γji
∂αi
, (A137)
together with similar expressions for ∂G(i|j)/∂βi and
∂2G(i|j)/∂ǫi∂βi.
15. Derivation of eqs. (A82) and (A83).
To derive eq. (A82), following condition (A79), one
should find the points of zero velocity (A76) on the β = 0
axis:
∂P (i|j)
∂αi
+ (1− ǫi)∂P (i|j)
∂γji
∂γji
∂αj
= 0. (A138)
Solving this equation for α results in (A82), taking into
account the expressions for payoff P (A72) and γji (A33).
Derivation of eq. (A83) is analogous to the derivation
of eq. (A82). One should substitute eqs. (A72) and
(A33) into (A77), finding its zeros on the α = 1 axis.
The stability condition (A80) holds for the stable
points (A82) and (A83) in cases of (b > 0, c < b) and
(b > 1, c > b) correspondingly. This can be checked by
substituting eqs. (A71) and (A72) into condition (A21)
(matching (A80) in case of a confined population):
∂vα
∂α
∝ − (1+b)K
3(−1+ǫ)ǫ3
“
1+(−1+2K2)ǫ−
√
1+(−2+4K2)ǫ+ǫ2
”“
−1+ǫ+
√
1+(−2+4K2)ǫ+ǫ2
”
“
−1+ǫ−2Kǫ+
√
1+(−2+4K2)ǫ+ǫ2
”
2
“
−1+ǫ+2Kǫ+
√
1+(−2+4K2)ǫ+ǫ2
”
3 ,
K = c
b
, (A139)
and
∂vβ
∂β
∝ b(−1+ǫ)ǫ
3
“
K(−1+ǫ)+
√
K2(−1+ǫ)2+4ǫ
”“
K2(−1+ǫ)−2ǫ+K
√
K2(−1+ǫ)2+4ǫ
”
“
K(−1+ǫ)−2ǫ+
√
K2(−1+ǫ)2+4ǫ
”
2
“
K(−1+ǫ)+2ǫ+
√
K2(−1+ǫ)2+4ǫ
”
3 ,
K = c−1
b−1 . (A140)
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These expressions are negative in the regions (b > 0, c <
b) and (b > 1, c > b) correspondingly.
The condition (A81) holds for the stable points (A82)
and (A83) in the cases of (b > 0, c < b) and (b > 1, c > b)
correspondingly, assuming equal probabilities to be the
second to respond (see (A37)) in the course of an in-
teraction. It can be checked by substituting the general
expression for the payoffs P (A3) together with eq. (A37)
in eqs. (A71), (A76) and (A77). The derived expression
for v⊥ are too cumbersome to be present here, though
they can be handled with the help of a symbolic calcula-
tion software, e.g. Wolfram Mathematica.
